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RECENT DECISIONS

CoRPORATIONs-STocKHOLDER's DERIVATIVE Su-IT-LIABILITY OF DrRECTORS FOR ACTS IN LABOR DrsPUTE-Plainti:ff, for himself and all other
stockholders of R corporation similarly situated, brought action against the
directors of the corporation, alleging that they had caused the dismantling and
removal of corporate factories and the curtailment of production, that great
loss to the corporation had been caused thereby, and that these things were done
solely to discourage and punish the corporation's employees by removing hope
of re-employment. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state a cause of action. The trial court denied the motion. The appellate
division reversed, stating that the complaint showed only a reasonable exercise
of business judgment.1 On appeal, held, reversed. The alleged acts amount
to actionable breaches of duty by the directors. Ahrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y.
52, 74 N.E. (2d) 305 (1947).
The court simply states that the alleged facts may fall into one of several
categories of acts for which directors may be liable, because contrary to the
public policy of New York and the United States. 2 It is well established that
directors may be liable for mismanagement through negligence or to serve
their own interests,3 but the 'business judgment' rule has been invoked by the
courts as a bar to actions in which the stockholder merely desires the court
to act as arbiter of the wisdom of the directors' acts.4 The court's opinion may
well be interpreted as meaning that in leading the corporation into a path which
was opposed to the public policy of the state and nation, as expressed in their
statutes, the directors risked personal liability, regardless of having exercised
sound business judgment.5 Courts have found liability without regard for good
faith where a state insurance law was violated by the directors,6 and where
their acts were prohibited by a state banking law.7 In both of these decisions,
however, the statutes were designed for the protection of the stockholders and
creditors of the corporation. Much the same language was used, however, in
a case involving the breach by directors of a statute intended for the public
Abrams v. Allen, 271 App. Div. 326, 65 N.Y.S. (2d) 421 (1946).
30 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940) § 704; 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 158
(National Labor Relations Act); the Taft-Hartley Act contains language which is
almost identical to this provision of the N.L.R.A.; Labor-Management Relations Act,
§ 8, Public Law IOI, 80th Cong., 1st sess., c. 120, § 8 (1947). As a result of
this same labor dispute, the corporation had been ordered to desist from its unfair
labor practice in refusing to bargain collectively with its employees. N.L.R.B. v.
Remington Rand, Inc., (C.C.A. 2d, 1938) 94 F. (2d) 862.
3 STEVENS, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, § 147 (1936); BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS,
§ 63 (1946).
4 Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E. (2d) 18 (194:z.), where the court
said that errors of judgment do not indicate a lack of fidelity, even though so gross
that they demonstrate the unfitness of the director. Helfman v. American Light &
Traction Co., 121 N.J. Eq. 1, 187 A. 540 (1936); Henry v. Wellington Tel. Co.,
76 Ohio App. 77, 63 N.E. (2d) :z.33 (1945); Rous v. Carlisle, 261 App. Div. 432,
26 N.Y.S. (2d) 197 (1941). See Carson, "Further Phases of Derivative Actions
Against Directors," 29 CoRN. L. Q. 431 (1944).
5 3 FLETCHER, CYc. CoRP., § 1024 (1947).
6 Van Schaick v. Carr, 170 Misc. 539, 10 N.Y.S. (2d) 567 (1938).
7 Broderick v. Marcus, 152 Misc. 413, 272 N.Y.S. 455 (1934).
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benefit. 8 It would be understandable that any willful breach of a statute should
result in liability per se for the directors, where such a violation would result
in criminal prosecution and a fine against the corporation. But where, as in
the principal case, the maximum risk is a cease and desist' order from a federal
court, with the alternative possibility of frustrating the union's demand for
higher wages, business judgment might well calculate the risk to be worth
taking. Support for this view is found in another recent New York decision,
where it was held that submission by the directors to an illegal exaction of
money by union officers was not necessarily •a ground for liability, but rather
a situation for the exercise of business judgment. The cou,rt repudiated as the
basis of liability the theory that the acts of the directors were contrary to public
policy,9 but one consideration of policy is probably the most rational explanation
of the decision in the principal case: the court is simply anxious to discourage
trifling with the legislature's labor policy,10 even though such insubordination
might be a good business risk. This decision may have important ramifications
by furnishing an added weapon to stockholding union employees.11
William J. Schrenk

8 Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S. (2d)· 270 (1942),
affirmed without opinion, 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S. (2d) 589 (1944). The
court found no liability for a violation of the Sherman: Act, placing its decision largely
. on the ground that the directors could not reasonably have known. that their acts
violated the statute.
9 Hornstein v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., (N.Y. Co. S.Ct. 1942) 37 N.Y.S. (2d)
404; affirmed, 292 N.Y. 468, ·55 N.E. (2d) 740 (1944). But see also, Roth v.
Robertson, 64 Misc. 343, IIS N.Y.S. 351 (1909), where liability for paying an
illegal bribe was upheld on grounds of public policy.
10 See especially 30 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940) § 704, 1f 10, designating as an unfair labor practice interfering with or coercing employees in the exercise
of any of their guaranteed rights.
11 46 YALE L. J. 1424 (1937), discussing Pipelow v. Lindemann & Haverson
Co., (Cir. Ct. of Milwaukee County, Wis., Dec. 24, 1936). The action, very similar
to the principal case, unfortunately was never carried beyond the trial stage.

